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Introduction  
 
The use of children for acts of terrorism is not a recent phenomenon. However, with the 
proliferation of terrorist groups that maintain prolonged control over significant areas and 
their respective populations, the extent of the problem has greatly increased. Children in such 
territories might be exposed to years of persistent indoctrination efforts, coupled with training 
in military and terrorist tactics. Wresting control of territory from terrorist groups is rather 
straightforward in theory, even if it proves quite difficult in execution. Reintegrating into 
society children who have adopted an identity linked to violent extremism, and who have 
possibly already personally committed acts of violence, is significantly more complex. 
 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Aleksandar Pašagić, Email: aleksandar.pasagic@gmail.com; Gjure Szaba 15, 
10000 Zagreb, Croatia, https://hr.linkedin.com/in/aleksandarpasagic 
Abstract 
In parts of the Republic of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic controlled by the 
Islamic State children were subjected to systematic indoctrination into extremist 
ideologies, with many of them being actively integrated into the Islamic State to 
be trained as the next generation of fighters. As Islamic State lost virtually all 
physical territory to other actors in the region, these children will present a serious 
long-term threat to security and stability unless successfully reintegrated into 
functioning communities. When available data on the way the Islamic State 
recruited, trained and indoctrinated children is examined, it can be seen that these 
children exhibit characteristics of child soldiers as well as those usually found in 
members of terrorist organizations. This paper therefore argues that, in order to 
devise and implement an optimal approach to their reintegration, relevant lessons 
should be drawn both from child soldier reintegration initiatives as well as from 
terrorist deradicalization and rehabilitation programs. Those lessons should then 
be adapted to specific requirements and constraints of this particular case. 
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While a number of terrorist organizations is reported to use children in different 
capacities and to varying extents2, it is the Islamic State (IS - formerly known as the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria) that elevated this problem to an unprecedented degree. This paper will 
therefore focus on children who are or have been members of that particular organization, and 
examine the likely challenges that will arise in connection to their rehabilitation and 
reintegration. 
The problem of reintegrating child members of terrorist groups into society can be 
approached in various ways. They can be treated as child soldiers and attempts can be made to 
reintegrate them drawing upon experiences from similar efforts undertaken largely in African 
states. They can also be viewed as terrorists and subjected to disengagement and 
deradicalization processes commonly used in such cases. Both of those approaches have 
advantages and disadvantages. The ideological component of terrorist indoctrination is often 
much more significant than the one used for purposes of soldiering; on the other hand, 
incentives for disengagement and deradicalization effective in adults might not be 
immediately transferable to children. These approaches are not mutually exclusive, as many 
elements of one will necessarily be found in the other, and their convergence will be greater 
precisely in cases of large terrorist organizations utilizing strategies and tactics usually 
associated with more traditional armed groups. There are other ways to address the problem 
of children in terrorist organizations; the reason this paper focuses on two aforementioned 
broad approaches is due to the magnitude of the problem and the objective constraints of the 
environment it is situated in, as these will largely dictate the amount of resources available to 
such projects. 
After addressing key terms and definitions, the paper will proceed by creating an 
overall picture of children in the IS. This will be followed by a general overview of the state 
of knowledge about reintegration of child soldiers, as well as deradicalization and 
rehabilitation of terrorists. The lessons from these two approaches will then be combined and 
reviewed for their applicability to children in the IS, ultimately arguing that, in order to 
 
2 M. Bloom and J. Horgan, “The Rise of the Child Terrorist”, Foreign Affairs, 9 February 2015, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2015-02-09/rise-child-terrorist accessed February 19 2017. 
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address this challenge with a reasonable chance of success, both approaches must be 
leveraged in a context-specific way. 
 
On definitions and terminology 
There is no universal definition of a child soldier. According to UNICEF, the term 
includes “any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of ... armed group in any 
capacity, including ... cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups ... 
The definition ... does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried 
arms.”3 This definition is very broad and, given the UNICEF’s mandate, understandably so; 
all children associated with armed groups should be afforded adequate protection. It should be 
clear, however, that actions required for secure and successful reintegration might vary 
significantly with regard to specificities of a child’s involvement. 
Attempts to define terrorism in a universally acceptable way face similar problems, 
due to serious political implications of this label. It would be difficult to dispute that the IS 
indeed exhibits key attributes of a terrorist organization by any definition; but due to varying 
degrees of involvement with the IS an individual can have, it is much less clear whether all 
those associated with it at some point could accurately be considered terrorists. This is 
especially problematic with children. Many will reason that the very idea of a ‘child terrorist’ 
is problematic because it is debatable whether a child can rationally pursue political aims or 
hold a genuine belief in any particular ideology.4 This is a valid argument; still, it does not 
remove from existence large numbers of children trained in the use of force and indoctrinated 
in violent ideologies to a greater or lesser extent. Children attached to the IS are, by definition, 
child soldiers. However, the ideological component must be addressed as well, regardless of 
how shallow we might think a child’s acceptance of it actually is. The potential capacity of 
child combatants to inflict harm upon others should not be taken lightly. This in no way 
 
3 UNICEF, Cape Town Principles and Best Practices (Cape Town: UNICEF, 1997), Definitions. 
4 L. Gittos, “There is no such thing as a child terrorist”, Spiked, 27 July 2015, http://www.spiked-
online.com/newsite/article/there-is-no-such-thing-as-a-child-terrorist/17233 accessed February 19 2017. 
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diminishes the fact that they are victims themselves, but those roles are not mutually 
exclusive.5 
Any time a child is involved in violence, especially if it has a role of the perpetrator, 
there is bound to be some controversy due to the sensitivity of the issue. Labelling any child a 
‘soldier’ or, even worse, a ‘terrorist’, might seem like assigning children agency to a degree 
that often doesn’t correspond with the reality of their situation. The lines between terrorism 
and warfare are becoming increasingly blurry, making it difficult to clearly designate roles 
children play in certain conflicts. It is certainly not the intention of this paper to equate 
children in armed groups with adult soldiers, nor children attached to terrorist organizations 
with adult terrorists; both terms are inherently unfortunate and an oversimplification of the 
nuanced levels of involvement a child might have with such groups and organizations. 
 
Children and the IS – the scope of the problem 
 
The attention the IS paid to actively involving children in its functioning is significantly 
greater than anything exhibited by terrorist groups that preceded it. It was definitely not the 
first terrorist organization to either undertake the mission of indoctrinating the youth6 or use 
them operationally. However, perhaps exactly because the IS considered itself not a 
movement but a state, children were not viewed merely as tools to be used in furtherance of 
tactical objectives, but as strategic assets. For the IS, training and indoctrination of children 
was essentially a state-building project,7 as they were considered to be a new and improved 
generation of fighters.8 
 
5 C. Martinez Squiers, “How the Law Should View Voluntary Child Soldiers: Does Terrorism Pose a Different 
Dilemma?”, SMU Law Review 68 (2015), p. 575. 
6 UN, Children and armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, 20 April 2016, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2016/360&referer=/english/&Lang=E accessed February 
21 2017, p. 14. 
7 Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, The Cubs of the Caliphate: How the Islamic State attracts, coerces 
and indoctrinates children to its cause (Baghdad: Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, 2016), p. 3. 
8 M. Townsend, “How Islamic State is training child killers in doctrine of hate”, The Guardian, 5 March 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/05/islamic-state-trains-purer-child-killers-in-doctrine-of-hate 
accessed February 6 2017. 
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There were several ways children could have come to be associated with the IS. They 
could have been children of supportive locals or foreign fighters, abandoned children found in 
orphanages, runaways who volunteered for service, as well as children taken from their 
parents by force.9 Some families enrolled their children into IS programs for purely economic 
reasons, as the IS paid a monthly salary to children in its service.10 For some children, 
especially refugees, the IS may in fact have appeared as the hopeful solution for the future, 
offering structure, purpose, and a sense of belonging.11 
Whatever their original circumstances might have been, once in a training camp, a 
child’s ethno-religious identity was actively supressed by enforced uniformity,12 as they were 
subjected to round the clock combination of indoctrination and weapons training.13 They were 
systematically desensitized to aggression through physical punishment and regular exposure 
to violence, both virtually and in person,14 and those refusing to carry out executions ordered 
by the IS faced the risk of extreme corporal punishment, including amputations.15 By the time 
a child was ordered to kill an actual person, many of them were so desensitized that they 
found it neither mentally not physically repulsive.16 Children who showed greater aptitude for 
ideology and were able to communicate well were used to help recruit other children.17 
 
9 J. Horgan and M. Bloom, “This is how the Islamic State manufactures child militants”, VICE News, 8 July 
2015, https://news.vice.com/article/this-is-how-the-islamic-state-manufactures-child-militants accessed February 
6 2017. 
10 B. Berti and A. B. Osete, “’Generation war’: Syria’s children caught between internal conflict and the rise of 
the Islamic State”, Strategic Assessment 18:3 (2015), p. 46. 
11 A. Gallagher, “The Islamic State’s child soldiers”, Al Monitor, 3 April 2015, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/lebanon-islamic-state-child-soldiers-syria-iraq-hrw-afp.html accessed 
February 9 2017. 
12 Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies (2016), p. 11. 
13 A. Rossi, “Islamic State training child suicide bombers in special camp”, Sky News, 18 December 2016, 
http://news.sky.com/story/islamic-state-training-child-suicide-bombers-in-special-camp-10700852 accessed 
February 6 2017. 
14 J. G. Horgan, M. Taylor, M. Bloom and C. Winter, “From cubs to lions: A six stage model of child 
socialization into the Islamic State”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 0 (2016), p. 10. 
15 L. Adel, “Islamic State amputates hands of 2 children for refusing to execute civilians”, Iraqi News, 2 
February 2017, http://www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/islamic-state-amputates-hands-2-children-refusing-execute-
civilians/ accessed February 6 2017. 
16 A. Loyd, “The children of Islamic State”, The Times Magazine, 21 January 2017, 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-children-of-islamic-state-0ldjj6l8t accessed February 6 2017. 
17 M. Bloom, “Cubs of the Caliphate”, Foreign Affairs, 21 July 2015, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-07-21/cubs-caliphate accessed February 8 2017. 
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Child soldiers are usually transplanted from their normal environment into an armed 
group, and their existence while in that group appears mostly separate from their previous life. 
The situation with the IS was different: a large number of people found themselves in the 
‘physical’ IS without being active members of the group. There are currently an estimated 2 
million individuals under 18 who have lived under the IS since its inception.18 Children who 
were recruited into the organization itself were not necessarily extracted from their regular 
communities. This lack of separation between normal and abnormal modes of existence 
makes it difficult for a child to comprehend which activities are acceptable and which are not. 
Even children who were never directly associated with the IS through formal membership in 
one of its training programs were still subjected to a continuous and systematic radicalization 
campaign. As the IS gained control over a certain populated area, it went to great lengths to 
appropriate educational institutions and adapt their curriculum to reflect its ideology.19 It 
established its own Office of Education, and has systematically modified the curriculum of 
primary and secondary schools to promote religious extremism,20 while practical skills taught 
in school included bomb-making.21 Parents who opposed the idea of their children being 
indoctrinated in this manner were left with no option but to deprive them of formal education 
altogether.22 
Indoctrination efforts started even before a child reached school age.23 Very young 
children were lured through gradual socialization, by being made to feel they were part of a 
 
18 S. Mekhennet and J. Warrick, “For the ‘children of ISIS,’ target practice starts at age 6. By their teens, they’re 
ready to be suicide bombers”, The Washington Post, 7 October 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/for-the-children-of-isis-target-practice-starts-at-age-6-
by-their-teens-theyre-ready-to-be-suicide-bombers/2016/10/06/3b59f0fc-8664-11e6-92c2-
14b64f3d453f_story.html?utm_term=.d9bca4a52bc6 accessed February 8 2017. 
19 Berti and Osete (2015), p. 49. 
20 UN (2016), p. 26. 
21 G. Gupta, “Bomb classes and gun counts: trauma of Mosul children under Islamic State”, Reuters,  24 January 
2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-schools-idUSKBN1581SZ accessed February 6 
2017. 
22 Iraqi Institution for Development, Education in Mosul under the Islamic State (ISIS) 2015-2016 (Mosul: Iraqi 
Institution for Development, 2016), p. 4. 
23 A. Withnall, “Isis booklet issues guidelines to mothers on how to raise ‘jihadi babies’”, The Independent, 1 
January 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-booklet-issues-guidelines-to-mothers-
on-how-to-raise-jihadi-babies-9952721.html accessed February 9 2017. 
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special group; only later was this followed by ideological education.24 A variety of tools was 
used to reach young children, including creating terrorism-themed smartphone games.25 As 
many parents were forced to feign adherence to IS ideology in order to avoid reprisals, young 
children were passively radicalized by the environment they were growing up in. It was a 
common occurrence for the IS to pay or in some other way incite children to spy and inform 
on their relatives, friends and neighbours.26 This suggests that many adults refrained from 
saying anything contrary to the teachings of the IS in front of children out of fear of being 
reported. 
Children recruited into the IS were put to various uses, from active participation in 
combat to donating blood for injured fighters.27 They were also consistently used for suicide 
attacks,28 but not because they were considered expendable; adult fighters regularly 
performed suicide operations as well. 
Child members of the IS present a unique challenge in that many of them are much 
like child soldiers: they were a part of an armed group and trained in weapons and tactics. But 
they are also very much like terrorists: they were integrated in an exclusive group and 
intensely indoctrinated in a shared violent extremist ideology. Therefore, in exploring how 
best to manage such children, there is a need to draw upon lessons from dealing with both 
child soldiers and terrorists. 
 
 
 
 
 
24 Bloom (2015). 
25 B. Farmer, “Islamic State children’s mobile app lets junior jihadists attack Big Ben”, The Telegraph, 19 
December 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/12/19/islamic-state-childrens-mobile-app-junior-
jihadists-attack-big/ accessed February 6 2017. 
26 Horgan et al. (2016), p. 9. 
27 K. Kuntz, “First come the sweets, then the beheadings”, Der Spiegel, 29 July 2016, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-how-the-is-trains-child-soldiers-a-1103941.html 
accessed February 6 2017. 
28 Bloom et al. (2016), p. 30; O. Dorell, “Here’s how the Islamic State turns children into terrorists”, USA 
Today, 22 August 2016, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/08/22/islamic-state-trains-children-
terrorists/89107872/ accessed February 6 2017. 
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Reintegration of child soldiers 
 
Child soldiers are used throughout the globe; by some estimates, almost 80 per cent of 
conflicts worldwide involve children below the age of 15.29 However, available literature 
mostly draws on reintegration research conducted in several African states, primarily Sierra 
Leone, Uganda, Burundi, Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The 
extensive use of children in conflicts in those areas, as well as the subsequent involvement of 
a number of international non-governmental organizations focused on reintegration of 
demobilized children, made those states conducive to research of the topic.  
Scholarly research of recruitment mechanisms and causes behind the increased use of 
children in violent conflicts has lagged behind the immediacy of the issue, often contributing 
to either paralysis or uninformed action.30 But while the subject of reintegration of child 
soldiers is still understudied relative to its far-reaching significance,31 there is enough material 
to allow for some extrapolation based on similarities across programs and states they were 
implemented in. 
One thing almost universally agreed upon is that the reintegration of child soldiers is 
difficult. Reintegrating adult combatants is usually easier because they were socialized to 
appropriate norms prior to their engagement in hostilities, but involvement in violence at an 
early age can arrest social development of a child.32 Some former child soldiers have shown 
to be incapable of distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable behaviour upon their return to 
 
29 E. Kaplan, “Child soldiers around the world”, Council on Foreign Relations, 2 December 2005, 
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/child-soldiers-around-world/p9331#p7 accessed February 19 2017. 
30 V. Achvarina and S. F. Reich, “No Place to Hide: Refugees, Displaced Persons, and the Recruitment of Child 
Soldiers”, International Security 31:1 (2016), p. 163. 
31 M. J. D. Jordans, I. H. Komproe, W. A. Tol, A. Ndayisaba, T. Nisabwe and B. A. Kohrt, “Reintegration of 
child soldiers in Burundi: a tracer study”, BMC Public Health 12:905 (2012), p. 2. 
32 L. Russell and E. M. Gozdziak, “Coming Home Whole: Reintegrating Uganda’s Child Soldiers”, Georgetown 
Journal of International Affairs 7:2 (2006), p. 59. 
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their families and communities, and have perpetrated acts of violence, contributing to their 
further exclusion from the community. In their minds, they never ceased being soldiers.33 
Rejection of the soldier identity is the most basic step towards a successful 
reintegration, and children who fully embraced their role as members of the armed group 
present the greatest challenge. It is this level of identification with the group that appears to be 
the most reliable indicator of the level of aggression a child is likely to exhibit during the 
reintegration process, more so than whether the child has actually been forced to kill another 
human being.34 This particular piece of data serves as a reminder that certain important things 
about former child combatants might be somewhat counterintuitive, and it might be dangerous 
to make uninformed assumptions when assessing which of them pose the greatest risk. 
Once an armed group decides to integrate a child into its ranks, the process appears 
very consistent across groups and countries. Children are gradually socialized into violence, at 
first mostly through physical abuse and humiliation. Unwarranted expressions of emotions 
such as empathy towards victims of the group are punished, and children are assigned tasks 
with an increasing level of violence, culminating in killing of unarmed human beings. This is 
combined with specific ceremonies and symbolic rites of passage, aimed at severing the 
child’s connections to their former lives – families, communities, and perceptions of what is 
right and what is wrong.35 Group’s enemies are depersonalized, and child’s identity is formed 
through a culture revolving around weapons, symbolism of uniforms and selective use of 
traditional rituals.36 Once they are accepted as members of the group, they are likely to engage 
 
33 L. Verneij, “Socialization and reintegration challenges: A case study of the Lord’s Resistance Army” in 
Özerdem, A. and S. Podder (eds.) Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), p. 183. 
34 E. Schauer and T. Elbert, “The psychological impact of child soldiering” in Martz, E. (ed.), Trauma 
Rehabilitation After War and Conflict: Community and Individual Perspectives (New York: Springer Science & 
Business Media, 2010), p. 347. 
35 N. Boothby,  J. Crawford and J. Halperin, “Mozambique child soldier life outcome study: Lessons learned in 
rehabilitation and reintegration efforts”, Global Public Health 1:1 (2006), p. 90. 
36 J. Trenholm, J., P. Olsson, M. Blomqvist and B. M. Ahlberg, “Constructing Soldiers from Boys in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo”, Men and Masculinities 16:2 (2012), pp. 212, 215, 216. 
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in a whole range of violent acts, a number of them often directed against their families and 
communities they were taken from.37 
One of the largest empirical studies on demobilization and reintegration of child 
soldiers, undertaken in Sierra Leone, has shown that ideologues, male fighters and younger 
former combatants find it more difficult to break ties with their units.38 Time spent attached to 
the group also plays a significant role: children who were with the armed group longer are 
harder to re-socialize, as they are more likely to identify themselves as members rather than 
victims of the group.39 And an early age of entry into a violent group is likely to result in 
higher levels of appetitive aggression – a rewarding perception of the perpetration of 
violence.40 
Reintegration, defined by the UN as a process “by which ex-combatants acquire 
civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income,”41 is multifaceted and should 
include social, economic, psychological, legal and political dimensions.42 These dimensions 
are mutually reinforcing and a comprehensive program would ideally address all of them, 
though with appropriate prioritization. 
The first step in the reintegration process might involve placing children in dedicated 
assistance centres. Also called Interim Care Centres (ICCs), these controlled environments 
provide an opportunity for individual assessment. The programs there are likely to focus on 
establishing appropriate codes of conduct, re-establishing self-regulatory processes through 
rewarding group-oriented behaviours, and activities that promote security and trust. A 
 
37 T. S. Betancourt, I. Ivanova Borisova, T. Philip Williams, T. H. Whitfield, J. Williamson, R. T. Brennan, M. 
de la Soudiere and S. E. Gilman, “Sierra Leone’s Former Child Soldiers: A Follow-Up Study of Psychosocial 
Adjustment and Community Reintegration”, Child Development 81:4 (2010), p. 1078. 
38 M. Humphreys and J. M. Weinstein, “Demobilization and reintegration”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
51:4 (2007), p. 533. 
39 N. Boothby, “What happens when child soldiers grow up? The Mozambique case study”, Intervention 4:3 
(2006), p. 249. 
40 R. Weierstall, R. Haer, L. Banholzer and T. Elbert, “Becoming cruel: Appetitive aggression released by 
detrimental socialisation in former Congolese soldiers”, International Journal of Behavioural Development 37:6 
(2013), p. 210. 
41 UN, Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards: Level 4 Operations, Programmes 
and Support - Reintegration (New York: UN, 2014), p. 2. 
42 Tonheim (2014), p. 634. 
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renewed sense of meaning is provided by traditional and religious authorities through 
ceremonies that help children come to terms with their past deeds, renounce affiliation to 
armed group, acknowledge government authority and embrace love of family and 
community.43 Centres can also be used to provide initial medical care and (re)introduce a 
typical day structure through scheduling.44 The time a child spends in an ICC can be used to 
trace the family and prepare the community for receiving the child, as well as to plan the 
reintegration process.45 
ICCs might be a good place to provide psychological assistance to children, as many 
are likely to benefit from it. Short-term trauma focused treatment seems to help with the 
reduction of PTSD symptoms,46 but long-term monitoring is required to ensure successful 
reintegration. This is especially true because the challenges for the child do not end the 
moment he is separated from the armed group; events during the reintegration itself might be 
just as traumatic.47 This long-term psychological care can generally be carried out with a good 
degree of success by adequately trained local lay counsellors.48 
However, temporary institutionalization of former child soldiers will not always be a 
viable option, and even when it is, UNICEF strongly recommends “all efforts should be made 
to keep or reunite children with their families or to place them within a family structure”49 as 
soon as possible. If a child has already returned to his family and community on his own or 
through their help, he should not be forced to join a formal reintegration process that would 
 
43 Boothby et al. (2006), p. 93. 
44 I. Derluyn, S. Vindevogel and L. De Haene, “Toward a Relational Understanding of the Reintegration and 
Rehabilitation Processes of Former Child Soldiers”, Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment & Trauma 22:8 
(2013), p. 873. 
45 UN, Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards: Level 5 Cross-cutting Issues – 
Children and DDR (New York: UN, 2006), p. 19. 
46 V. Ertl, A. Pfeiffer, E. Schauer, T. Elbert and F. Neuner, “Community-Implemented Trauma Therapy for 
Formed Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda: A Randomized Controlled Trial”, The Journal of the American 
Medical Association 306:5 (2011), p. 503. 
47 T. S. Betancourt, R. T. Brennan, J. Rubin-Smith, G. M. Fitzmaurice and S. E. Gilman, “Sierra Leone’s former 
child soldiers: A longitudinal study of risk, protective factors, and mental health”, Journal of the American 
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 49:6 (2010), p. 612. 
48 Ertl et al. (2011), p. 504. 
49 UNICEF (1997), p. 3. 
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include removing him from his family once again.50 This is consistent with the almost 
universally agreed upon idea that it is the social aspect of reintegration that truly determines 
its success or failure, and forms the basis for all other types of reintegration.51 It is also the 
most complex one, as returning child soldiers often face discrimination, stigmatization, and 
exclusion.52 
Challenges to social reintegration are numerous. In many cases, the returning children 
have been a part of a group that has inflicted great harm upon the community in question, and 
some might have actively participated in acts of violence. This makes fear the first obstacle to 
overcome. The community fears the children because of who they think they are and what 
they might do, often justifiably so. It is true that most former child soldiers just want to be 
reunited with their families53 and start a normal life. But it has also been shown that the 
propensity for violence, learned while being a part of a militant group, often stays with the 
individual once he returns to the civilian setting; and both male and female ex-combatants are 
more likely to engage in violent behaviour than general population.54 While child soldiers 
have experienced trauma-inducing events, more often than not so have the communities they 
are to be reintegrated into. Their anxiety is to be expected.55 Children whose involvement was 
limited to support roles, including girls who were used for domestic tasks, sexual purposes, or 
were forcibly married to adult members of the armed group are not immune from social 
exclusion either.56 
Children also fear the reaction of the community and potential retribution,57 and this 
mutual fear reinforces distrust. Some communities manage to draw upon their own internal 
 
50 UN (2006), p. 21. 
51 Tonheim (2014), p. 642. 
52 Derluyn et al. (2013), p. 871. 
53 Boothby et al. (2006), p. 95. 
54 UN (2014), p. 41. 
55 Derluyn et al. (2013), p. 873. 
56 M. Tonheim, “Genuine social inclusion or superficial co-existence? Former girl soldiers in eastern Congo 
returning home”, The International Journal of Human Rights 18:6 (2014), p. 637. 
57 S. Schiltz, S. Vindevogel, E. Broekaert and I. Derluyn, “Dealing with Relational and Social Challenges After 
Child Soldiering: Perspectives of Formerly Recruited Youth and Their Communities in Northern Uganda”, 
Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 26 (2016), p. 314. 
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resources and resilience to cope with the challenges of reintegrating returning children,58 but 
most will need, and would certainly benefit from, at least some degree of outside help. While 
this help is likely to initially be provided largely by actors outside of the state the reintegration 
is taking place in, such as foreign NGOs and organizations like the UN, relying exclusively on 
them to carry the process through is not recommended. Successful reintegration is, above all, 
a long-term project,59 and funding from external donors has a tendency to decrease once the 
country in question is no longer perceived in a state of emergency. 60 This is not to say that 
resources available through foreign sources should not be used to maximum effect. There are 
likely to be situations where outside help will be the only help available; most reintegration 
initiatives are set up by NGOs as governments often have more pressing matters to deal with 
in the immediate aftermath of a conflict.61 NGOs have also been known to create programs 
for reintegration of child soldiers even before the cessation of hostilities in a given region,62 
but they are hardly perfect. Among other identified problems, they might want to steer 
community needs in the direction of the help they are interested in or able to provide, while 
not necessarily doing what is actually most needed.63 For long-term success, the majority of 
the effort should come from the community itself. 
One particular use external actors are well-suited for is financial assistance, but simply 
giving money to returning child soldiers or their immediate families in hope that they will put 
it to best use is not a realistic option, and might even be counterproductive. 64 If the standard 
of living in the community is low, overtly devoting significant resources to returning child 
soldiers might serve only to alienate them further, as people might resent perceived 
preferential treatment of those who contributed to the present misfortune of the community.65 
 
58 S. Vindevogel, M. Wessells, M. De Schryver, E. Broekaert and I. Derluyn, “Informal and formal supports for 
former child soldiers in northern Uganda”, The Scientific World Journal 2012 (2012), p. 2. 
59 Jordans et al. (2012), p. 10. 
60 Derluyn et al. (2013), p. 874. 
61 Derluyn et al. (2013), p. 872. 
62 Russell and Gozdziak (2006), p. 57. 
63 S. Shepler, “The rites of the child: Global discourses of youth and reintegrating child soldiers in Sierra Leone”, 
Journal of Human Rights 4:2 (2005), p. 204. 
64 UN (2006), p. 21. 
65 Derluyn et al. (2013), p. 871. 
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“Dual targeting” assistance programs that distribute resources between the individual and his 
community have shown to have higher success rates, as have area-based interventions which 
target a specific geographic territory where there are large groups of individuals in need of 
reintegration. These interventions leverage locally based resources and actors through large-
scale economic projects, helping the community come together in the process of 
reintegration.66 
Long-term reintegration process is usually preceded by a set of short-term, targeted 
measures termed reinsertion. Reinsertion includes economic assistance to provide for 
immediate needs of former combatants, but does not guarantee sustainable income.67 In order 
for reintegration to be permanent, returning child soldiers must be enabled to become self-
reliant and productive members of their communities.68 To this end, resources allocated to 
assist demobilization and reintegration should not be distributed as an immediate relief, but 
managed as a long-term investment.69 
Re-enrolling children into formal educational programs is generally recommended.70 
Apart from the obvious benefits, schools serve as an environment where they can build and 
rebuild positive social ties.71 But some former child soldiers might be so far behind in their 
education that it is unlikely they will ever catch up, leading only to frustration and loss of 
time.72 For such children, programs should be developed to provide vocational training 
suitable to the needs of the communities they are reintegrated in.73 Equipping youth with 
practical skills could help them take part in rebuilding communities they have participated in 
destroying.74 Even some of the skills and knowledge a child has acquired during his time with 
 
66 UN (2014), pp. 9-10. 
67 UN (2014), p. 7. 
68 T. S. Betancourt, S. Simmons, I. Borisova, S. E. Brewer, U. Iweala and M. De La Soudiere, “High hopes, grim 
reality: Reintegration and the education of former child soldiers in Sierra Leone”, Comparative Education 
Review 52:4 (2008), p. 565. 
69 UNICEF (1997), p. 5. 
70 UNICEF (1997), p. 3. 
71 Betancourt, Ivanova Borisova et al. (2010), p. 1081. 
72 Betancourt et al. (2008), pp. 570, 578. 
73 UN (2006), p. 27. 
74 Russell and Gozdziak (2006), p. 61. 
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the armed group might be beneficial for the community, and capitalizing on those might help 
them reintegrate faster.75 
However, depending largely on their age, some children will simply not be motivated 
to resume school, and educational stipends will prove ineffective. They might primarily want 
to “earn money, find a wife and build a house.”76 In those cases, support tools might include 
on-the-job training, informal education, assistance in starting and maintaining self-
employment, and micro-finance support.77 Having an income-generating activity has shown 
to be an effective tool in preventing re-recruitment.78 
Reintegrating child soldiers also presents legal and political problems, driven largely 
by the question of the degree to which the children should be held responsible for their 
association with the armed group. While some children might state and indeed believe that 
they have joined an armed group of their own accord, it can be debated whether that choice 
can truly be viewed as their own, given their cognitive development and the complex 
implication of such a decision.79 On the other hand, the example of Uganda setting the 
minimum age for criminal responsibility at 12 years of age80 illustrates how specificities of a 
conflict influence the way child soldiers might be viewed by the law. 
Finally, what is actually known about the success rate of demobilization and 
reintegration programs for child soldiers? Broad generalizations across countries may be 
misleading, but hope is definitively present. Research shows that former child soldiers in 
Burundi have integrated well within their communities, have high employment and literacy 
rates, and no apparent differences can be seen in functioning and mental health when 
compared to never-recruited peers.81 Reintegrated boys in Mozambique tracked into 
adulthood seem to fare as well or better than the average in most economic and social 
 
75 Derluyn et al. (2013), p. 878. 
76 Boothby et al. (2006), p. 105. 
77 Jordans et al. (2012), p. 3. 
78 J. McKnight, “Child Soldiers in Africa: A Global Approach to Human Rights Protection, Enforcement and 
Post-Conflict Reintegration”, African Journal of International and Comparative Law 18:2 (2010), p. 134. 
79 Derluyn et al. (2013), p. 870. 
80 McKnight (2010), p. 133. 
81 Jordans et al. (2012), p. 7. 
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indicators, and severity of psychological trauma appears to decrease as time passes, though it 
never goes away completely.82 
 
Disengagement and deradicalization of terrorists  
 
When examining ways in which an individual can be separated from an extremist group, two 
broad terms most often used are disengagement and deradicalization. Deradicalization as an 
initiative is a term commonly used to “refer to programmes that are generally directed against 
individuals who have become radical with the aim of re-integrating them into society or at 
least dissuading them from violence,”83 while on an individual level it can be defined as “a 
reduction in commitment to extremism and a change in beliefs that conforms to mainstream 
values.”84 It is naturally preferable to simple disengagement, as it suggests not only the 
cessation of participation in terrorist activities or contact with terrorist groups, but also a 
change in ideology.85 Deradicalization, however, cannot easily be measured; and as with any 
other endeavour whose ultimate objective is essentially to change someone’s mind (and in this 
particular case, possibly someone’s identity), it might simply be too much to hope for. 
Ultimately, a state’s objective regarding terrorism is mostly measured in acts of terrorism that 
it managed or failed to prevent, so disengagement is likely to be considered a ‘good enough’ 
outcome.86 
 
82 Boothby et al. (2006), p. 101. 
83 UN, First Report of the Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to Terrorism: Inventory of 
State Programmes, 2008, https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=10129 accessed February 21 
2017, p. 5. 
84 B. F. Bubolz and P. Simi, “Leaving the world of hate: Life-course transitions and self-change”, American 
Behavioral Scientist 59:12 (2015), p. 1589. 
85 Conti (see Conti, B., “Between Deradicalisation and Disengagement: The Re-engagement of the Radical 
Actor?” in Jayakumar, S. (ed.), Terrorism, Radicalisation and Countering Violent Extremism: Practical 
Considerations and Concerns (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 56.) suggests that both deradicalization 
and disengagement seem to deprive the subject of a sense of agency, and proposes a more involving approach of 
“re-commitment.” 
86 M. J. Williams and S. C. Lindsey, “A social psychological critique of the Saudi terrorism risk reduction 
initiative”, Psychology, Crime & Law 20:2 (2014), p. 136. 
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In certain ways, it might be argued that disengagement is to deradicalization what 
reinsertion is to reintegration. When pressed for time, both reinsertion and disengagement are 
good places to start, and provide visible indicators of progress. However, neither of them are 
meant to be the complete solution, and should be followed by a set of more strategic and 
thorough measures in order to significantly reduce the risk of subjects relapsing into violence. 
The certainty with which definitive conclusions on the effectiveness of a given 
deradicalization approach can be drawn is limited, largely because it is a complex process 
whose success has to be measured in the long term (though abject failure is likely to be 
observable in the short term as well). Public access to data on such programs is also limited, 
as most of them are run by governmental agencies; this means that a lot of the information is 
classified, and what is released has to be viewed with awareness that governments have a 
clear interest in presenting their deradicalization initiatives as successful. Lack of data also 
leads to programs being evaluated based on what intuitively seems likely to work, but honesty 
requires recognizing that there are still a lot of unanswered question about how radicalization 
works and, subsequently, how deradicalization works.87 However, as with reintegration, 
deradicalization is a time-sensitive issue, dictating immediate and continuous action while 
constantly integrating new knowledge as it becomes available.88 
Among various deradicalization programs, the one used in Saudi Arabia is often 
presented as the flagship of such initiatives.89 Its main strength is the broad spectrum of 
activities it encompasses, all of which are intended to work synergistically towards 
permanently separating a former terrorist from the group and accompanying extremist 
ideologies. Broadly speaking, it employs six angles of approach. First, in-group members 
 
87 M. Dechesne, “Deradicalization: not soft, but strategic”, Crime Law and Social Change 55:4 (2011), p. 291. 
88 Both radicalization and deradicalization are complex processes that can be approached through a variety of 
theoretical frameworks (see Koehler, D. Understanding Deradicalization: Methods, Tools and Programs for 
Countering Violent Extremism (Oxon/New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. 65 – 94.); elaborating on them is beyond 
the scope of this paper. What is presented here is an overview of most common threads in various 
deradicalization programs. 
89 It is not the intention of this paper to present any of the deradicalization programs mentioned as a standard or a 
blueprint to be followed indiscriminately; the effectiveness of all of them is understudied due to a number of 
objective constraints (see Horgan, J. and K. Braddock, “Rehabilitating the Terrorists? Challenges in Assessing 
the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs”, Terrorism and Political Violence 22:2 (2010), pp. 267-291.). 
Nonetheless, elements of these programs and their variations are likely to be used until better approaches appear. 
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such as family and friends are asked to persuade the individual to renounce violent extremism. 
Counter-ideologues perceived as authorities on religious matters by the subject attempt to 
persuade him of the doctrinal errors inherent in violent extremism, while already 
deradicalized former terrorists offer their own experiences on the merits of renouncing violent 
ideologies. The government provides financial and social support, including assistance in 
gaining employment, as well as continued psychological and religious support post-release. 
All the while, the subject is monitored and required to check in at regular intervals. Finally, 
the government helps in strengthening the subject’s social network, and incentivizes marriage 
and starting a family.90 
This is the blueprint generally copied in many Muslim-majority countries when 
tackling the deradicalization challenge. The extent of assistance, especially financial one, 
varies; but basic concepts are generally similar across the board. Indonesia believes the path 
to deradicalization begins with disillusionment91 with terrorist ideology or tactics, followed by 
development of relationships outside of extremist circles. This should lead to a change of 
priorities in an individual, while law enforcement uses soft approaches to assist him in re-
joining normal society.92 Similarly, India’s approach includes having the subject engage in a 
dialogue with moderate religious authorities and receive education and vocational training. 
Family and community are involved in the process of resocialization, stable relationships are 
promoted, and therapy is provided if needed.93 
Focusing exclusively on providing access to jobs and financial help when helping 
former fighters to reintegrate is to oversimplify the deradicalization process. Money does 
help, but the notion of economic deprivation being the principal driver behind terrorism is 
 
90 Williams and Lindsey (2014), p. 137. 
91 While disillusionment consistently appears as a factor in the process of disengagement, it is seldom sufficient 
to initiate separation from a terrorist organization. Research has shown that it usually needed to be combined 
with rational cost-benefit analysis, which validates original, more emotional impulse to disengage. See Hwang, 
C. J. Why Terrorists Quit: The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2018), p. 172. 
92 Z. A. Sukabdi, “Terrorism in Indonesia: A review on rehabilitation and deradicalization”, Journal of 
Terrorism Research 6:2 (2015), p. 40. 
93 E. B. Hearne, “Re-examining India’s counterterrorism approach: Adopting a long view”, Strategic Analysis 
36:4 (2012), p. 535. 
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increasingly losing credibility.94 Other programs have initially focused on the war of ideas, 
based on an assumption that if one could only be persuaded to replace a violently extremist 
worldview with a more moderate one, the problem is essentially solved. There will always be 
a limited number of true ideologues, and they are most likely to be found at the top of the 
terror group’s hierarchy. But many of the group’s members don’t join the group because they 
find every idea it promotes appealing; instead, they first find the idea of belonging to a group 
appealing, and they adopt the group’s ideology once they have assumed the identity of being a 
member of that group. 
Breaking away from terrorism will therefore succeed or fail based on how effectively 
an individual can be separated from a terrorist group as well as from an ideology. As theories 
advocating that those attracted to terrorism are primarily drawn to it by the promise of 
companionship and meaning in life gain ground,95 deradicalization programs must adapt by 
shifting their focus on influencing relationships between the individual and the community, as 
well as between the individual and the terrorist group. The extremist identity adopted through 
exposure to and interaction with a radical organization is primarily a group identity. Once the 
individual becomes part of such a group, he is likely to defend the complete ideology of the 
group, even if he has doubts regarding certain aspects of it.96 By forcibly removing him from 
that group, a void appears that has to be filled with an adequate substitute if deradicalization 
process is to be successful.97 The deradicalized individual has to assume a new role, a new 
identity, complete with corresponding relationships and responsibilities. In cases where an 
individual’s attachment to the ideology of the group is secondary to his attachment to the 
group itself, deradicalization is facilitated by establishing a new identity as a family man and 
a productive member of the society, and the accompanying feeling of social responsibility.98  
 
94 J. Auld, “The need for a national deradicalisation program in Afghanistan”, Journal for Deradicalization 4 
(2015), p. 214. 
95 C. Mink, “It’s about the group, not God: Social causes and cures for terrorism”, Journal for Deradicalization 5 
(2015), p. 69. 
96 F. Wali, “Post-radicalisation identity: Understanding ‘collective identity’ within radical Islamist groups”, 
Journal of Social & Psychological Sciences 4:1 (2011), p. 50. 
97 Hearne (2012), p. 534. 
98 Williams and Lindsey (2014), p. 142. 
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The idea that deradicalization is a process that takes place in the physical world just as 
much as in the mind directs deradicalization efforts towards creating a favourable 
environment to reintegrate into, including securing an education, an income generating 
activity, a place to live in and a supportive social circle.99 This means providing support to the 
individual in question, but also to other involved parties. Saudi Arabia has, for example, 
recognized the advantage that could be gained in leveraging the returning extremist’s family 
and immediate social circle, and offers them social support on the condition that the returning 
individual does not relapse.100 
Ideological aspects will still have to be addressed by any serious deradicalization 
program. Especially in dealing with religious extremism in general and Islamist extremism in 
particular, the fact that a terrorist group binds its ideology to religious identity of its members 
has a significant influence on how that aspect of deradicalization should be approached. The 
underlying objective of this part of the deradicalization process is basically the same across 
programs: the individual should be persuaded that religious interpretations exalting violence 
as an individual obligation of a believer are a distortion of the true spirit of the religion. This 
is then ideally followed by the individual’s acceptance of a more moderate interpretation of 
religious teachings. Such an approach has the best chance of bypassing the identity problem; 
if the subject can be persuaded that violence is not integral to his religion, conditions are set 
for him to renounce violence without feeling he is betraying his core beliefs in the process.101 
Once such an individual internalizes the idea that his religion does not prescribe acts of 
violence, he should become more resilient to any subsequent re-radicalization efforts.102 
When attempting to ideologically deradicalize an individual, a government must 
proceed with great caution, as he will likely be an adherent of narratives aimed at portraying 
the government’s objectives as fundamentally incompatible with his personal religious 
 
99 J. Horgan, “What makes a terrorist stop being a terrorist?”, Journal for Deradicalization 1 (2014), p. 3. 
100 A. Rabasa, S. L. Pettyjohn, J. J. Ghez and C. Boucek, Deradicalizing Islamist extremists (Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 2010), p. 21. 
101 Williams and Lindsey (2014), p. 140. 
102 Rabasa et al. (2010), p. 4. 
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obligations.103 This is why it is important that those involved in the deradicalization process 
be well acquainted with relevant religious teachings and practices, thus avoiding the risk of 
antagonizing the subject and reinforcing his negative views of the government.104 
Deradicalization efforts are generally directed at individuals and, as much as 
circumstances and available resources allow it, are tailored around his specific views and 
situation. However, experiences from interrogations of members of the IS in Iraq have shown 
that the final obstacle in gaining cooperation was the subject’s fear that his comrades would 
think less of him.105 Collective deradicalization campaigns that took place in Egypt and 
Libya106 are different from the mass deradicalization of children and youth that will have to 
take place in areas where extremist groups are removed from power, but lessons learned 
suggest that deradicalizing a group has a sort of a multiplication effect on each individual 
within that group. The group of interest here is not the formal terrorist organization itself, but 
a social group within that organization: individuals that are held in that place more by mutual 
bonds than by allegiance to the organization’s ideology. If those bonds could be preserved, 
perhaps an entire group could be ideologically transplanted from an extremist into a moderate 
worldview. Leaving an extremist organization with other people is easier than leaving it on 
one’s own, because those leaving with friends or family find it easier to imagine a future life 
outside of the organization, in essence taking their social support structure with them.107 
Deradicalization initiatives aimed specifically at children, such as the Sabaoon 
program in Pakistan, are still rare. Sabaoon works on deradicalization of a number of children 
rounded up by government forces during operations against the Taliban, turned in by their 
parents for re-education, or who have surrendered themselves to escape from the Taliban. 
These children have been trained in broad spectrum of active and supportive military roles, 
and many were subject to intensive indoctrination by the Taliban. The program tries to 
 
103 F. Demant and B. De Graaf, “How to counter radical narratives: Dutch deradicalization policy in case of 
Moluccan and Islamic radicals”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33:5 (2010), p. 411. 
104 Sukabdi (2015), p. 47. 
105 Mink (2015), p. 72. 
106 Rabasa et al. (2010), p. 81. 
107 Bubolz and Simi (2015), p. 1598. 
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counteract the effects of those experiences by providing a standard school curriculum 
combined with counselling sessions and vocational training, with the focus on 
deradicalization through promoting ideas of interreligious tolerance and incompatibility of 
suicide bombings with the teachings of Islam.108 A team of psychologists supports the regular 
curriculum and, while the school continues to be a target of militants and is forced to keep its 
location a secret with the addition of extensive security measures,109 the program looks 
promising for the time being.110 
Tracking success rates of deradicalization programs is complex and demanding, even 
assuming a uniform consensus is reached on how exactly success is to be measured. 
Recidivism rate in the Saudi program is estimated to be between 10 and 20 per cent,111 but the 
reoffending rate for released Guantanamo Bay detainees is also reported to be around 20 per 
cent, and the Saudi program is only available to those who have not directly caused injury or 
loss of life in the first place.112 As more data becomes available, it is expected that 
deradicalization initiatives will fine-tune their approaches, although any real precision in 
either program design or success tracking still seems rather distant.   
 
Deradicalization and reintegration of children in the IS 
 
After reviewing some key lessons from reintegration and deradicalization efforts, it should be 
possible to make certain informed predictions about the challenges lying ahead for child 
members of the IS and communities that will try to reabsorb them, as well as make some 
recommendations based on approaches that have shown the most promising results. 
 
108 M. Fitzgerald, “Today’s lesson: how not to kill”, Irish Times, 8 January 2011, 
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/today-s-lesson-how-not-to-kill-1.1276857 accessed February 8 2017. 
109 C. Coughlin, “Pakistan school offers hope for children rescued form the Taliban”, The Daily Telegraph, 5 
October 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9590838/Pakistan-school-offers-hope-
for-children-rescued-from-the-Taliban.html accessed February 8 2017. 
110 J. Horgan, “Child suicide bombers find safe haven”, CNN News, 27 March 2013, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/27/world/asia/pakistan-anti-taliban accessed February 8 2017. 
111 J. Stern, “Mind over martyr: how to deradicalize Islamist extremists”, Foreign Affairs 89:1 (2010), p. 95. 
112 Williams and Lindsey (2014), pp. 135, 137. 
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It should be noted that this paper concerns itself with the reintegration and 
deradicalization of children who will continue their lives in Iraq and Syria. The children of 
foreign fighters who will be repatriated, or children who will be relocated to another country 
for other reasons, will be subject to whatever rehabilitation program is in use in the 
destination country.113 The process of determining who is ultimately responsible for children 
of foreign fighters is a complex legal problem in its own right due to a number of factors, 
from the lack of adequate documentation needed to provide proof of parentage for orphaned 
children, to the tendency of many states to delay assuming responsibility for such children for 
as long as they can, often invoking security concerns.114  It should also be taken into account 
that Iraq and Syria differ significantly in many aspects, so it is likely that their approaches to 
reintegration and deradicalization will also differ; but the essential problems they will face 
will be similar, and principles valid in one state are likely to be valid in the other one also. 
What should also be mentioned is that the almost exclusive focus of this paper on boys 
rather than girls is not an accidental omission. It is estimated that up to 40 per cent of child 
soldiers worldwide are female,115 the hardships suffered by girls associated with armed groups 
being just as great as those endured by boys, and they often face even greater difficulties 
reintegrating. Many communities consider girls who were victims of sexual abuse to be 
 
113 While an important issue in itself, the deradicalization and integration of such children is beyond the scope of 
this paper. Documents such as those by RAN (see RAN, Child returnees from conflict zones, 2016, and RAN, 
Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families, 2017) exhaustively elaborate on 
recommendations for dealing with returnees, including children. These recommendations assume a level of 
dedicated infrastructure, resources, and institutional commitment that can reasonably be expected from stable 
and relatively affluent states, as well as a relatively small number of children in need of such help. It would be 
unrealistic to expect countries such as Iraq and Syria, which are the focus of this paper, to be able to replicate 
such an environment at this point in time, given their current political and security situation. Therefore, this 
paper strives to achieve a balance of sorts when outlining reintegration approaches between what might be 
considered optimal and what might be considered realistic, given objective constraints that countries in question 
are facing. 
114 J. Cook and G. Vale, From Daesh to 'Diaspora' II: The Challenges Posed by Women and Minors After the 
Fall of the Caliphate (2019), ICSR, https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ICSR-Feature-From-Daesh-to-
%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-II-The-Challenges-Posed-by-Women-and-Minors-After-the-Fall-of-the-
Caliphate.pdf accessed September 3 2019, p. 10. 
115 IRIN, “Girl soldiers face tougher battle on return to civilian life”, The Guardian, 18 February 2103, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/feb/18/girl-soldiers-battle-civilian-
life?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 accessed March 2 2017. 
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impure or promiscuous,116 and girls who have children of their own from the time they were 
associated with the armed group are especially likely to experience social rejection.117 
However, strict segregation of roles by gender within the IS in accordance with espoused 
radical ideology means that the use of violence was reserved almost exclusively for male 
children. They will present the most immediate security concern, and it can be expected that 
the greatest part of the reintegration effort will be tailored to mitigate the risk they present. 
When considering rehabilitation of children formerly under the IS, two general groups 
have to be addressed. The first are children who have lived in territories controlled by the IS, 
but were never actual members of the organization. These children, which might be called 
‘passively’ radicalized, make up the target population of a long-term deradicalization effort, 
strategically important for ensuring that the next generation is able to break the cycle of 
radicalization and violence. It is likely, however, that this long-term project will have to give 
way to a more pressing problem, and that is the children who were actively involved in the 
functioning of the IS. Likely to be a bit older, and therefore more physically and intellectually 
capable of inflicting real and immediate harm, they will have to be managed with an 
appropriate sense of urgency.118 This urgency might necessitate an unfortunate trade-off 
between what would be optimal and what can actually be done at any given moment.119 
 
Legal issues 
As is the case with reintegrating child soldiers elsewhere, there will be a set of 
complex and sensitive legal issues to be resolved before children who were part of the IS can 
 
116 Betancourt, Ivanova Borisova et al. (2010), p. 1081. 
117 Tonheim (2014), p. 638. 
118 Almohammad (see Almohammad, A., ISIS Child Soldiers in Syria: The Structural and Predatory 
Recruitment, Enlistment, Pre-Training Indoctrination, Training, and Deployment (2018), ICCT, 
https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ICCT-Almohammad-ISIS-Child-Soldiers-In-Syria-Feb2018.pdf 
accessed September 3 2019.) addresses the difference between “structural” and “predatory” recruitment, 
providing insight on how the type of recruitment might have implications on the degree of caution that should be 
employed during DDR efforts. 
119 A context-specific risk assessment template might be of great use in getting a general picture of the 
psychological state of a child (see Kizilhan, J. I., Providing Psychosocial Care to Child Soldiers Living in Post-
IS Iraq (2019), ICCT, https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ICCT-Kizilhan-Providing-Psychosocial-Care-
to-Child-Soldiers-Living-in-Post-IS-Iraq-May2019-1.pdf accessed September 3 2019, p. 5.). 
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be reinserted into their communities. A number of them will be very young, and unlikely to 
have actively participated in acts of violence; it can be reasonably assumed that such children, 
while still subject to some version of deradicalization program, will not be held responsible 
before the law. It is also likely that the animosity felt towards them by the community will be 
negligible; it will be relatively easy to perceive them as victims, and treat them accordingly. 
At the same time, a lot of them will have no reference point other than militant jihadism, and 
this will present its own set of challenges during resocialization.120 
On the other end of the spectrum are children closer to 18 years of age. They are likely 
to be treated as fully responsible before the law and culpable for both the acts they themselves 
might have done, as well as the association with the IS as an organization. Though children 
under the age of 18 cannot be held accountable for terrorism internationally, they can be 
sentenced in accordance with domestic laws, which are likely to have a lower age limit.121 
Arguably the most tragic figures will be children aged 18 or more at the time of capture, but 
who were taken in by the IS when they were much younger. While there might be some 
sympathy expressed due to their recruitment while they were children, this will probably not 
affect the outcome of them ultimately being treated as adult fighters. 
It is the bulk of children that will fall between those extremes that will prove the most 
problematic to deal with from a legal standpoint, with the most pertinent question being the 
one at what age should a child involved with an armed group be treated as an adult. The age 
limit of 18 for individuals to be considered child soldiers according to international law is as 
recent as 2002; prior to that, the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols set the 
maximum age at under 15.122 Cultural norms are also likely to play a significant role: while 
largely symbolic, it is generally accepted in Islam that a boy can be considered an adult as 
early as at 12 years of age, and at 15 in any case.  
 
120 C. Vinograd, G. Balkiz and A. C. Omar, “ISIS trains child soldiers at camps for ‘Cubs of the Islamic State’”, 
NBC News, 7 November 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/isis-trains-child-soldiers-
camps-cubs-islamic-state-n241821 accessed February 8 2017. 
121 L-D Obreja, “The use of child soldiers by terrorist organizations”, International Human Rights Network, 8 
December 2014, http://jushumanis.org/the-use-of-child-soldiers-by-terrorist-organizations/ accessed February 19 
2017. 
122 Kaplan (2005). 
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That many children aged 15 or under associated with the IS will be dealt with as adults 
can be concluded with reasonable certainty based on what is already known about the 
treatment of captured child soldiers of the IS. Human Rights Watch reported that the 
Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil holds in detention centres a number of boys aged 11 
to 17 on suspicion of involvement with the IS. Most were not formally charged or allowed 
access to a lawyer, and allegations of torture are common.123 Iraq considers children as young 
as nine to be legally responsible for their involvement with the IS.124 In both Iraq and Syria, 
captured children deemed to be members of the IS are usually treated as adult terrorists, and 
chances for any kind of rehabilitation in detention facilities where such children are held are 
virtually non-existent.125  
The tendency towards harsh sentencing and treatment of children associated with 
terrorist groups is a global trend.126 Israel allows the imprisonment of minors under the age of 
14 for certain terrorism-related offences,127 and children as young as 13 have been held at 
Guantanamo Bay.128 Fear of terrorism can provoke a disproportionate response towards 
perpetrators, even if they are minors, and even in places where the threat is very manageable. 
While treating children like adult terrorists should by all means be condemned, it should also 
be anticipated and adequate measures taken to minimize the far-reaching harmful effects of 
such practices. Incarceration in itself does not contribute to deradicalization; simply 
containing a radicalized individual will do nothing to change his core belief-system. If 
anything, it is likely to reinforce it.129 
 
123 Human Rights Watch, “KRG: Children allege torture by security forces”, Human Rights Watch, 29 January 
2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/29/krg-children-allege-torture-security-forces accessed February 8 
2017. 
124 Cook and Vale (2019), p. 13. 
125 Loyd (2017). 
126 C. Hamilton, F. Colonnese and M. Dunaiski, Children and Counter-Terrorism (Torino: UNICRI, 2016), p. 
37. 
127 L. Dearden, “Israel approves new law to jail child ‘terrorists’ as young as 12”, The Independent, 3 August 
2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/israel-approves-new-law-to-jail-palestinian-child-
terrorists-as-young-as-12-human-rights-stabbings-a7170641.html accessed February 19 2017. 
128 UNICEF (2009), p. 77. 
129 R. Gunaratna, “Terrorist rehabilitation: a global imperative”, Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter 
Terrorism 6:1 (2011), p. 65. 
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Disengagement and deradicalization 
Children who will not be subject to incarceration will either be reinserted into their 
communities, to be followed up on through deradicalization programs, or they will be 
assigned to an interim care centre. Ideally, this choice will be made on case-by-case basis. 
Following pertinent recommendations, confinement to ICCs would be limited to those 
children assessed to present too great a risk to be reinserted given their current psychological 
state, children in need of immediate care (physical or psychological), or children waiting for 
suitable conditions for reinsertion. In any case, this confinement should be as limited in 
duration as possible. In practice, however, it can be expected that the route a child will take 
will largely depend on resources available at the moment a child enters the program, so 
planning should address the need for reassessment and corrective actions. If, while tracking a 
child’s progress, it is revealed that his status regarding confinement should be altered, 
measures should be taken to do so as quickly as feasible. 
Those detained in ICCs will probably be submitted to some kind of deradicalization 
program. Some of it will be incidental; once physically removed from the IS, children will 
naturally be exposed to different worldviews, most of them contradicting the ideology they 
were taught while within the IS. A lot of it will be planned and structured. Exactly how the 
initiative for deradicalization and reintegration of child members of the IS will look like is 
hard to predict. It will most likely be a hybrid of existing deradicalization programs, adapted 
according to needs and available resources. What can be assumed with reasonable confidence 
is that it will not have the means available to programs in countries such as Saudi Arabia or 
Singapore. The need to reintegrate a large number of children and youth into a society 
burdened with demands of restoring normalcy and maintaining basic security, and do so 
quickly, might easily overwhelm official capacities. International NGOs might provide 
considerable assistance in work force and funds, but they should operate cautiously and in 
close cooperation with local resources, keeping a light footprint and avoiding building 
programs depending exclusively on foreign aid for their functioning. 
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Whoever ultimately staffs the ICCs will face serious initial challenges. More 
radicalized children will actively try to spread extremist ideology to their peers in the 
centre.130 Lessons from child soldier reintegration efforts suggest some children might avoid 
any interaction, and some might be violent, causing understandable apprehension for the staff. 
However, as time goes by, children tend to become less unruly, and significant changes might 
take as little as three months.131 
Children confined to ICCs will by definition interact with other children formerly 
associated with the IS, and this might prove to be either a catalyst for positive change or a 
hindrance to the success of the program. The critical decision those responsible for the 
program will have to answer is should they try to break up groups of children and focus 
primarily on the individual approach, or should they try to leverage the cohesion existing 
among group members and attempt a collective deradicalization of sorts. Both options are 
promising and risky at the same time. 
Individual approach makes sense in the light of the fact that, although many children 
were subject to similar treatment by the IS, how this treatment affected them will vary 
significantly from one child to another.132 This means that any generalized deradicalization 
treatment will fall anywhere on the continuum from insufficient to excessive, and both too 
much and not enough engagement are likely to be ineffective at best and counterproductive at 
worst. The individual approach is also compatible with physically separating the child from 
his group, should it be concluded that the group has a negative effect on the process of 
deradicalization. The child will still maintain contact with his peers, which is indispensable 
for facilitating socialization and re-learning how to function in a community in peacetime. 
However, the program can now tailor the child’s immediate social circle by putting him in 
contact with already deradicalized children of similar age and experiences, which has shown 
to have promising positive effects. Establishing connection with peers who can demonstrate 
 
130 Loyd (2017). 
131 Boothby (2006), p. 249. 
132 S. Vindevogel, K. Coppens, I. Derluyn, M. De Schryver, G. Loots and E. Brokaert, “Forced conscription of 
children during armed conflict: Experiences of former child soldiers in northern Uganda”, Child Abuse & 
Neglect 35 (2011), p. 560. 
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personal understanding of what the individual is going through is considered an important part 
of most deradicalization programs. 
But the strength of bonds many children develop with other members of their group 
can lead to a state where the group is considered family,133 and breaking it up will 
significantly add to the trauma. If the program is structured in a way which creates an 
impression of having to betray the group in order to be considered deradicalized, it is setting 
itself up for failure. On the other hand, if the program can manage to leverage interpersonal 
connections between participants so that the transition from extremist to moderate ideology 
happens collectively, without exposing any single member to feelings of being socially 
ostracised by his peers, it can potentially be more effective than focusing on individual 
subjects. Ideally, children will ultimately come to view themselves as part of a broader 
community, both socially and ideologically.134 There is also the question of whether 
confinement should be fixed or flexible in duration. Most deradicalization programs aimed at 
adult terrorists have no set time limit. Terrorists are generally in some kind of detention, and 
being considered deradicalized enough is a prerequisite for being eligible for release, however 
long that might take. But setting this as a condition for allowing a child to move from 
temporary confinement to reintegration stage is very problematic. Even highly structured and 
long-running deradicalization programs still struggle with deciding what should be defined as 
acceptably deradicalized state, and keeping children in confinement indefinitely will only 
make the problem worse by eventually producing adult detainees, which will then have to be 
moved to standard incarceration facilities. Once this happens, it might undo all previous 
efforts at deradicalization. 
A fixed confinement period, on the other hand, allows for the possibility of some of 
the children being moved on to reintegration phase while still harbouring extreme ideologies. 
Other children, while ostensibly not dangerous, will be deprived of professional attention and 
care a longer stay in an ICC would have provided. At the same time, a fixed period of 
 
133 Verneij (2011), p. 182. 
134 S. V. Marsden, Reintegrating Extremists: Deradicalisation and Desistance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2017), p. 80. 
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confinement means some children will be detained longer than necessary, and certain lessons 
from rehabilitation of criminal offenders suggest that directing efforts that are too intense at 
only moderately radicalized individuals might actually result in their increased 
radicalization.135 In any case, children for whom the set period of confinement will be just 
about right are likely to be outnumbered by those who could use either more or less of it. 
In terms of both debates (individual versus collective treatment and fixed versus flexible 
duration), the issue of practicality will be impossible to avoid. There will be a lot of work to 
be done, with many children, in a short amount of time, and with limited resources. These 
considerations tend to favour the collective, set-time option. 
 
Reinsertion and reintegration 
The first decision that will have to be made is what microenvironment a returning 
child should be reinserted in. While the child’s immediate family appears to be the obvious 
and preferred choice, in many cases situation might be more complex. On the one hand, 
reintegrating into one’s own family might promote a sense of return to normalcy. Being close 
to a parent, especially to the mother, acts as a protection against post-traumatic stress 
reactions,136 and positive parental support might help guard against recidivism.137 On the 
other hand, this will not be possible or even recommendable in several scenarios. Some 
children will have no families to reintegrate them into: they may be orphans or their kin might 
be impossible to identify and/or locate. A number of children will have parents that are in 
need of deradicalization themselves, or are unfit to take care of their returning child for some 
other reason.138 There will be cases in which it was the parents themselves who voluntarily 
 
135 S. Mullins, “Rehabilitation of Islamist terrorists: Lessons from criminology”, Dynamics of Asymmetric 
Conflict 3:3 (2010), p. 179. 
136 I. Derluyn, E. Broekaert, G. Schuyten and E. De Temmerman, “Post-traumatic stress in former Ugandan child 
soldiers”, The Lancet 363 (2004), p. 862. 
137 M. A. Hakim and D. R. Mujahidah, “Social context, interpersonal network, and identity dynamics: A social 
psychological case study of terrorist recidivism”, Asian Journal of Social Psychology 0:0 (2018). 
138 There are notable articles (see Koehler, D., “Family Counselling, De-radicalization and Counter-Terrorism: 
The Danish and German programs in context” in Zeiger, S. and A. Aly (eds.), Countering Violent Extremism: 
Developing an evidence-base for policy and practice (Perth: Curtin University, 2015), pp. 129-136.; Koehler, D. 
and T. Ehrt, “Parents’ Associations, Support Group Interventions and Countering Violent Extremism: An 
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gave the child up for training and indoctrination by the IS, in which case the risks of returning 
him to their care might outweigh potential benefits.139 Finally, returning children to their 
original homes might also be problematic if they have troubling memories or associations 
linked to the physical location in question, as location of a traumatic experience was shown to 
be one of the strongest triggers for reliving that trauma in former child soldiers.140 In these 
cases, relocation of the entire immediate family might be necessary for the well-being of the 
child. 
If returning a child to his immediate family or close kin is unrecommendable, the 
government would ideally establish a support network of reliable foster families who would 
take care of returning children and guide them through the reintegration process. As this is 
likely to be almost impossible in practice due to the extent of such a program and resources 
required, especially in a post-conflict environment, an alternative solution might be the 
establishment of a government-affiliated social service that would monitor and evaluate the 
progress of each child and his family once they are reunited.141 This ‘least-worst’ option is 
fraught with problems and ultimately relies on good-intentioned guesswork. There is no 
adequate precedent to help evaluate if it is better to place a radicalized child in a foster care of 
questionable quality, or return it to its radicalized immediate family and hope they will all 
deradicalize together. As with many other facets of this initiative, what can be done will 
probably outweigh what is best. 
Whatever the point of reinsertion into normal life may ultimately be chosen, this will 
be where the real reintegration efforts begin. Almost all available data indicates that success 
of reintegration depends mostly on whether the child will be able to find his place in the 
community. Children of school age should be provided with the opportunity to go back to 
 
Important Step Forward in Combating Violent Radicalization”, International Annals of Criminology 56 (2018), 
pp. 1-20.) analyzing the importance of family in the process of radicalization prevention and deradicalization, 
though focusing primarily on families supportive of the deradicalization process. The challenges of reuniting 
children with families where members might hold on to certain radical views themselves is a complex and 
sensitive subject that merits further research and is beyond the scope of this article. 
139 Horgan et al. (2016), p. 15. 
140 Boothby (2006), p. 250. 
141 Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies (2016), p. 16. 
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classroom. Given what is known about the schooling system in the IS, even those who have 
finished school might need additional education to become productive members of society, 
either in the form of regular classes or vocational training. For those who can adapt to a 
learning environment, it will not only provide them with skills needed to be able to take care 
of themselves, but also with a structure that might ease the transition to an everyday system of 
functioning. National school curriculum can be expanded to include classes promoting civic 
virtues, thereby countering radical ideologies.142 
Children too old or otherwise disinclined to resume formal schooling should be 
assisted in starting a life of their own. This can be done through a combination of approaches 
already proven quite effective with child soldiers and deradicalized terrorists, including help 
in obtaining and maintaining gainful employment, providing micro loans and informal 
education, as well as requisite life skills they might be lacking. Supportive measures should 
be balanced between helping the individual child and helping the community he is 
reintegrated into, thereby promoting long-term development and avoiding feelings of 
resentment. 
Throughout the duration of the physical reintegration effort, continuous attention will 
have to be paid to psychological state of returning children. While most children would likely 
be diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, experience shows that placing too much 
weight on this aspect of their functioning might prove ineffective and even counterproductive 
due to the stigma accompanying Western concepts of trauma.143 Psychological assistance will 
therefore have to be administered more subtly and indirectly, preferably by adequately trained 
locals. 
The importance of considering the cultural context during the reintegration process 
cannot be overstated.144 What is often viewed as self-evident in the context of international 
laws might not be evident at all in communities where value systems are strongly rooted in 
 
142 Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies (2016), p. 17. 
143 Russell and Gozdziak (2006), p. 62. 
144 T. B. Zack-Williams, “Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone and the Problems of Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration into Society: Some Lessons for Social Workers in War-torn Societies”, Social Work Education 
25:2 (2006), p. 121. 
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traditional beliefs, including those concerning the rights and role of children in conflicts.145 It 
should not be taken for granted that all children will immediately come to view their 
separation from the IS and return to ‘normal’ life as a positive thing. Getting the child to 
accept the community he returns to might be even more of a challenge than getting the 
community to accept the child. 
Even if reinsertion appears to satisfy all relevant criteria, it should not be assumed 
everything is well. Data on returning child soldiers in Congo suggests that the initial 
welcoming reaction might not be a reliable indicator of long-term acceptance. Once the 
immediate excitement of a reunion subsided, more than half of the children in question felt 
rejected by parents and close family, and were treated in a way that made them feel 
excluded.146 Should the child come to feel rejected by his community, there is an increased 
chance he will reconnect with members of his former social circle, seeking security provided 
by group identity.147 If the child’s friends are behind him in the process of deradicalization, 
they might slow down his progress; on the other hand, many former child soldiers found that 
spending time with their friends helped dealing with upsetting memories.148 A planned 
program of pairing a child in the process of reintegration with a successfully reintegrated peer 
might prove to be a good compromise, satisfying the child’s need for companionship with 
those who shared his experiences while guarding against re-radicalization.149 
While there are recorded instances of children abandoning radical beliefs as soon as 
they were removed from conflict environments,150 generally there are no reliable ‘quick fixes’ 
for reversing an intense conditioning process that has taken place over a number of years.151 
Any reintegration initiative must be designed in a way that will enable its sustainability for 
 
145 McKnight (2010), p. 126. 
146 Tonheim (2014), p. 637. 
147 Mink (2015), p. 63. 
148 Betancourt et al. (2008), p. 580. 
149 Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies (2016), p. 18.; McKnight (2010), p. 134. 
150 Loyd (2017). 
151 J. Horgan, “Deradicalization or disengagement? A process in need of clarity and a counterterrorism initiative 
in need of evaluation”, Revista de Psicologia Social 24:2 (2009), p. 297. 
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prolonged periods.152 Often, people best suited to play a crucial role in such efforts are local 
teachers or religious leaders,153 as their natural presence in the community keeps them in 
continuous contact with the children and their families, without appearing invasive or 
threatening. Civil society organizations also hold significant potential for long-term 
reintegration assistance.154 
Establishing a structured reintegration program still does not guarantee that intended 
participants will actually make use of it. UN estimates that approximately 30 per cent of child 
combatants never enter formal disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
programs, either because they are unaware of that option, feel more protected elsewhere, or 
are deliberately excluded.155 The ignorance factor might be counteracted by a continuous, 
long-term public information campaign aimed at raising awareness of the existence of the 
program, as well as dispelling common misconceptions about it.156 The solutions to other 
reasons for non-participation will have to be more context-specific. 
Ultimately, reintegration represents “an exercise in renegotiation ... of values, norms 
and attitudes”157 which have been distorted over years of exposure to a culture exalting 
violence and intolerance. It is a complex, multi-faceted and demanding process. Ideally, it 
should be people-centred, flexible, accountable and transparent, nationally and locally owned, 
integrated and well planned, as well as gender sensitive.158 Even such initiatives might have 
no discernible impact: some studies have suggested that DDR programs seem not to have any 
effect at all, and that those excluded from them appear to reintegrate just as well as those that 
 
152 Betancourt et al. (2008), p. 581. 
153 UNICEF (1997), pp. 6, 11. 
154 C. Sumpter, “Countering violent extremism in Indonesia: priorities, practice and the role of civil society”, 
Journal for Deradicalization 11 (2017), p. 120. 
155 UN (2006), p. 20. 
156 UN (2014), p. 26. 
157 A. Özerdem and S. Podder, “Mapping child soldier reintegration outcomes: Exploring the linkages” in 
Özerdem, A. and S. Podder (eds.) Child Soldiers: From Recruitment to Reintegration (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), p. 313. 
158 UN (2014), p. 4. 
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took part.159 This might demonstrate the inherent resilience of communities and their 
“capacity and desire to protect their children.”160 
 
Conclusion 
 
Reintegration of children involved in terrorism, especially in territories controlled by the IS 
for prolonged periods, is likely to take place within a community that is struggling to restore a 
functioning level of normalcy. Sectarian divisions will take continuous toll on intercommunal 
relationships, and most resources and efforts will probably be directed at establishing and 
maintaining security in the narrowest sense of the word. Objective constraints will make it 
nearly impossible to execute any single facet of the reintegration program as well as it is 
theoretically possible. The situation might dictate that a large number of individuals, 
radicalized to a greater or lesser degree, be reintroduced into society first, and any efforts at 
structured deradicalization and reintegration will have to catch up as best they can. This might 
be very disheartening. However, good results can still be obtained by approaching the 
problem from all available angles and making the most out of every one of them. This is why 
it is important to study both child soldier reintegration and terrorist deradicalization and 
rehabilitation, as the intersection of those two approaches holds some key points to keep in 
mind when designing and implementing a program aimed at reintegrating child members of a 
terrorist group. 
There are other potentially promising yet understudied avenues of approach to dealing 
with child members of terrorist groups not addressed in this paper. These include lessons 
learned from studying rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents, especially those associated with 
gangs, cults or other tight-knit groups with distinctive ideologies. There might also be 
valuable lessons from work done in specialized shelters with children who were victims of 
domestic violence. Technology might be leveraged in the service of reintegration much like it 
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was used by the IS for purposes of radicalization.161 No approach with the potential of adding 
bits of pertinent knowledge should be overlooked; this problem is a puzzle, and the best way 
forward is putting as many pieces in place as possible, while constantly keeping the overall 
picture in mind.  
The pace at which the events in Iraq and Syria are unfolding, combined with the 
difficulty of obtaining timely and reliable information from the region, will create and 
maintain a gap between the academia and practice that will be difficult to close. While 
striving to maintain a realistic view, this paper, like a lot of work dealing with the subject, still 
unavoidably addresses what the author believes could be done based on what has been done 
elsewhere and at some prior time. Still, even at this point, one can observe both promising and 
concerning trends. On the one hand, Iraqi authorities have initiated the process of registering 
children born in IS-controlled territories.162 At the same time, there are reports of torture, 
arbitrary imprisonment and forced confessions of children suspected to be involved with the 
IS in some capacity by the governments of Iraq and Kurdistan.163 Conditions in one major 
camp in Syria, reported to hold at least 7,000 children under the age of 12, are dire in every 
respect and deteriorating still.164 While there is no shortage of ideas on how to approach the 
challenges of reintegration, it would be overly optimistic to assume those ideas will be applied 
consistently and with enthusiasm. Ultimately, future developments in the region will result in 
invaluable lessons, but these will come at a very high price. As one article put it, “Today’s 
victims are tomorrow’s terrorists, and no one will view them as victims anymore.”165 This is 
 
161 G. Vale, Cubs in the Lions' Den: Indoctrination and Recruitment of Children Within Islamic State Territory 
(2018), ICSR, https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICSR-Report-Cubs-in-the-Lions%E2%80%99-Den-
Indoctrination-and-Recruitment-of-Children-Within-Islamic-State-Territory.pdf accessed September 3 2019, p. 
4. 
162 K. al-Taie, “Iraq registers children born in ISIS-controlled areas”, Diyaruna, 9 July 2019, 
https://diyaruna.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_di/features/2019/07/09/feature-01 accessed September 8 2019. 
163 Human Rights Watch, “’Everyone Must Confess’: Abuses against Children Suspected of ISIS Affiliation in 
Iraq”, Human Rights Watch, 6 March 2019, https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/03/06/everyone-must-
confess/abuses-against-children-suspected-isis-affiliation-iraq accessed September 8 2019. 
164 Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families”, Human Rights Watch, 23 July 
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2019. 
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the tragedy the international community and local authorities should try to mitigate as much 
as possible. There are no easy answers or painless solutions but, given enough thought and 
effort, there just might be some promising endings. 
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